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IKf THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROY S. LUDLOW INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THOMAS W. OSTLER, NEIL W. 
OSTLER, LEE H. OSTLER, 
PAUL F. OSTLER, JOHN A. 
VANDERMYDE, DELBERT CHRISTENSEN, 
individually and all doing 
business as 
DESIGN LABEL MANUFACTURING, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Case No. 920174 CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide 
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, 
as amended) and Rule 42 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court was correct in admitting 
parole evidence to determine the intention of the parties to a 
written lease agreement. The standard of review is for 
correctness of law with no particular deference given to the 
trial court's conclusion. However, once the trial court 
concludes that the document is ambiguous and proceeds to find 
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facts respecting the parties1 intentionf then the standard of 
review is strictly limited. The trial court's judgment will 
then not be disturbed if, after reviewing the evidence in a 
light most supportive of the court's findings, the evidence is 
based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence. Lyngle 
v. Lyngle, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 65 (Utah App. 1992) 
2. Whether the trial court's finding that the lease 
provided that the tenants and landlord would jointly review 
the contract at the end of each year for possible renewal is 
clearly erroneous and should be set aside. To properly 
challenge the trial court's findings, the Appellant must 
marshall all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and then demonstrate that even reviewing it in the 
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the findings. Lyngle v. Lyngle, 
supra. Scharf v. BMG Corp, 700 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1985) 
3. Whether the trial court was correct in awarding 
attorney's fees to the Defendants. 
STATUTES AND RULES DETERMINATIVE OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5 Attorney's fees 
Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to 
either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed 
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after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory 
note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one 
party to recover attorney's fees. 
Rule 4-505 of the Rules of Judicial Administration -
Attorney's fees affidavits, 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorney's 
fees must be filed with the court and set forth specifically 
the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work 
performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to 
prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent in pursuing 
the matter to the stage for which attorney's fees are claim, 
and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for comparable legal 
services. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of case and course of proceedings. 
The trial of the matter was held on November 14, 
1991, and judgment was rendered on behalf of Defendants 
against the Plaintiff, no cause of action by the Court sitting 
without a jury. The Defendants cumulatively were granted 
judgment for attorney's fees in the total amount of $2,500.00 
to be divided amongst the seven Defendants equally. 
Prior to the trial, the court denied Plaintiff's 
Motion in Limine to exclude parole evidence which Defendants 
proposed to offer in order to explain the terms of a lease 
-4-
agreement which was the subject matter of the action commenced 
by Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has appealed the judgment of the trial 
court stating that the trial court improperly allowed parole 
evidence to be admitted to interpret the terms of the lease 
agreement and that it erred in awarding attorney's fees to the 
Defendants. 
b. Statement of Facts 
On or about April 1, 1987, the Defendants as tenants 
entered into a certain lease agreement with McMullin & Company 
as landlord. The landlord's interest in the lease agreement 
was subsequently assigned to Roy S. Ludlow Investment Company, 
the Plaintiff and Appellant in the above-entitled action 
(Ludlow). (R. at 194) The lease agreement was prepared by 
the original landlord, McMullin & Company, who was solely 
responsible for the language of the provisions contained 
therein. (R. at 284) 
Paragraph 2 of the lease agreement set forth the 
term of the lease as being for the period of three (3) years 
commencing April 19, 1987 and continuing to May 1, 1990. 
Notwithstanding this provision setting forth the term, the 
following sentence was added to the agreement at the bottom of 
page 6 and in the middle of paragraph 9 of the lease agreement: 
At the end of each year, the tenant 
and landlord will jointly review the 
contract for renewal. 
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At the end of the first year, after the lease had 
been assigned to Ludlow, the Defendants met with Mr. Ludlow to 
discuss keeping the lease at the current rent and to point out 
the option available to them pursuant to the sentence that had 
been inserted at the bottom of page 6 of the lease agreement. 
(R. at 195) Mr. Ludlow refused to negotiate any of the provi-
sions of the lease. (R. at 205) Not being a party to the 
original negotiations, Mr. Ludlow had no idea what the 
inserted sentence referred to. (R. at 275) Some time there-
after, Mr. Ludlow received notification that the Defendants 
were vacating the premises. (R. at 205) Some months later, 
on or about June 8, 1989, after finding a new tenant for the 
premises, Ludlow brought this action for damages on its lease 
agreement with Def€mdants. 
Richard Bruce McMullin testified on behalf of 
Ludlow. Mr. McMullin was the chief operating officer and 
president of McMullin & Company, the original landlord, and 
was the party who was responsible for negotiating and drafting 
the lease agreement with the Defendants. (R. at 189, 284) 
Mr. McMullin testified that he believed the term intended for 
the lease was for three (3) years with no option to renew 
after each of the years. (R. at 191, 278) When asked by 
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counsel why the typewritten insertion was made to the lease 
agreement, Mr. McMullin replied as follows: 
The way it's worded here is really a 
mystery to me. If I wrote this, I'm 
embarrassed to have written it in such 
a way because it is ambiguous and I 
don't recall exactly what it pertained 
to. To me, to the best of my interpre-
tation of what I was probably getting at 
in writing this, if in fact I did write 
it, and I would assume that I did because 
it appears here. However, I wish it was 
initialed by both parties. I would assume 
that it was a review of the common areas 
and the charges associated with the cam 
charges. (R. at 181) 
When asked by the Court as to why such insertion was placed in 
this lease when not included in other leases prepared by him, 
the following dialogue was had: 
MR. McMULLIN: I don't know. Maybe we 
ought to ask them why I put it in. I 
don't have any idea. 
THE COURT: You have no recollection why? 
MR. McMULLIN: I really don't, your Honor. 
I don't recall the purpose of it. To me 
it doesn't make a lot of sense the way it's 
presented here. I'm embarrassed that it's 
even in here. (R. at 182) 
Then after making an indication that such insertion referred 
to common area maintenance costs, Mr. McMullin was asked by 
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counsel if he had any recollection as to why such insertion 
was placed in paragraph 9 of the lease agreement rather than 
paragraph 5, which paragraph pertained to common areas. Mr. 
McMullin replied as follows: 
I don't. The way it's placed really 
doesn't make any sense to me. And 
normally I would initial such an adjustment. 
And I don't—maybe the Ostlers and Dale 
Christensen would have a better recall. 
I really don't recall what the intent of 
that particular sentence was, placed where 
it was, without reference to another part 
of the contract. It's confusing to me. 
(R. at 186) 
After the defense rested, Mr. McMullin was recalled 
by Ludlow as a rebuttal witness. After having heard the 
Defendants testify, Mr. McMullin testified that he was able to 
remember more of the transaction and as a result changed his 
understanding for the inserted sentence. (R. at 285) Mr. 
McMullin stated that instead of referring to CAM charges, the 
inserted sentence was added to meet the Defendants' concerns 
over the possibility of their business failing. Mr. McMullin 
testified that the sentence was inserted at the bottom of page 
6 to give the Defendants comfort that the lease would be 
renegotiated if their business failed. (R. at 283) 
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Mr. Delbert Lawrence Christensen, one of the 
Defendants and a signatory upon the lease agreement, when 
asked by counsel, stated that the lease agreement was not 
signed by him or the other Defendants when first presented to 
them. (R. at 209) The Defendants felt that they needed 
something additional in the lease agreement to protect them 
because they were a brand new company. (R. at 211) Mr. 
Christensen stated to Mr. McMullin at the time that they were 
looking for a termination clause after the first year if they 
had to get out of the lease. (R. at 211) Mr. McMullin then 
added the sentence at the bottom of page 6 and returned the 
agreement to Mr. Christensen and the other signatories for 
execution. (R. at 211-213) While the Defendants expected a 
three year term, it was with the understanding that if the 
company could not make a go of it, they would be able to 
renegotiate or leave. (R. at 229) 
Mr. Thomas Ostler, one of the Defendants and 
signatories on the lease agreement, confirmed the testimony of 
Mr. Christensen pertaining to the purpose for the sentence 
inserted at the bottom of page 6. (R. at 251-255) Mr. Neil 
Ostler, another Defendant and signatory of the lease agree-
ment, confirmed Mr. Christensen's testimony as well. (R. at 
263-265) It was the Defendants1 testmony that the subject 
sentence referred to the term of the lease and allowed the 
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lease to be subject to renewal after each year. But for the 
provision for renewal being added, the Defendants would not 
have signed the lease agreement. 
After previously denying Ludlow's Motion in Limine 
and ruling that the sentence inserted at the bottom of page 
6 of the lease agreement when viewed in light of paragraph 2 
of the lease agreement made those provisions ambiguous, the 
trial court listened to the testimony of the parties to 
determine their intent. At the conclusion of both the 
Plaintiff's and Defendants cases, the trial court felt that 
the only evidence before it was the testimony of the 
Defendants themselves as to what the intent of the term 
provision was. (R. at 308) The trial court found that the 
testimony of Mr. McMullin was vague, inasmuch as he had stated 
that he had no recollection of the discussions or negotiations 
concerning the lease agreement. (R. at 309) The trial court 
further found that the inserted sentence made no sense in 
connection with paragraph 9 or paragraph 5. The trial court 
further found that the language added at the bottom of page 6 
clearly referred to the parties renewing the contract at the 
end of each year. It therefore accepted the Defendants' 
testimony and found that the Defendants were excused from 
further performance under the lease agreement. (R. at 310) 
As to the payment of attorney's f€>es, the trial 
court refused to award any fees under the lease agreement 
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based on the language of the attorney's fees provision that 
limited fees to actions brought during the lease term. (R. 
at 310) The trial court did, however, award attorney's fees 
to the Defendants under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-56.5 (1953, as amended) which provides for a reciprocal 
right of a party to recover attorney's fees if one party to 
the contract is allowed attorney's fees under the provisions 
of such contract. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because the trial court determined that the contract 
was ambiguous and proceeded to find facts respecting the 
intention of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, the 
Appellate Court's review is strictly limited. The evidence 
and all inferences that may be drawn therefrom are viewed in a 
light most supportive of the findings of the trier of fact and 
will not be disturbed if the judgment is based on substantial, 
competent, admissible evidence. To mount a successful attack 
on the trial court's findings of fact, an appellant must 
marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the 
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is 
insufficent to support the findings. Ludlow has failed to do 
this. Instead of marshaling all of the evidence in support 
of the trial court's findings, Ludlow has simply emphasized 
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the portions of testimony that support its conclusions. The 
trial court's findings are therefore not properly challenged. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
BECAUSE THE LEASE AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS, THE TRIAL 
COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED PAROLE EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN THE 
PARTIES' INTENTION. 
Ludlow argues that the trial court improperly 
admitted parole evidence in varying the terms of the lease 
agreement entered into between McMullin & Company and the 
Defendants. The Utah Supreme Court in Union Bank v. Swenson, 
707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985), stated the parole evidence rule as 
it applies to contract interpretation as follows: 
The parole evidence rule as a principle 
of contract interpretation has a very 
narrow application. Simply stated/ the 
rule operates in the absence of fraud to 
exclude contemporaneous conversations, 
statements, or representations offered 
for the purpose of varying or adding to 
the terms of an integrated contract. 
In footnote 1, the trial court further explained the rule as 
follows: 
Note that although parole evidence is 
inadmissible to vary or contradict the 
clear and unambiguous terms of an 
integrated contract, parole evidence is 
admissible to clarify facial ambiguity, 
(emphasis added) 
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The initial inquiry, therefore, is whether the 
document on its face is ambiguous. Prior to trial, Ludlow 
brought a Motion in Limine, wherein Ludlow requested the trial 
court to rule that the parole evidence rule excluded extrinsic 
evidence to interpret the lease agreement. After reviewing the 
Memoranda of the parties, the trial court in its minute entry 
noted that the lease agreement contained a provision in page 1 
establishing the length of term for the lease to be three (3) 
consecutive full years. Then on page 6 of the lease agreement, 
under the paragraph entitled "Continuous Operation", the 
parties typed in the sentence: "At the end of each year, the 
tenant and landlord will jointly review the contract for 
renewal." That sentence did not appear to the trial court to 
apply exclusively to paragraph 9 of the lease. If it did 
appear exclusively to paragraph 9, it was not clear on its 
face how it did so. It appeared to the trial court that the 
sentence applied to the entire lease agreement. However, if 
applied to the entire lease agreement, it was inconsistent 
with page 1 of the lease which set the term of the lease at 
three (3) years. Therefore, the trial court ruled that the 
subject sentence is indeed ambiguous and that it would be 
helpful to the trier of fact to receive parole evidence to 
explain that particular provision of the lease. It therefore 
denied Ludlow's Motion in Limine. (See copy of Minute Entry 
attached as an Addendum) 
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The ambiguity of the provision was borne out in the 
testimony that was offered by Ludlow. Mr. McMullin and Mr. 
Ludlow testified on behalf of Ludlow. While Mr. McMullin 
testified that it was his belief that the term of the lease 
was for three (3) years unless the Defendants went bankrupt, 
he testified that the language of the sentence was confusing 
to him. He had first testified that the language must have 
applied to CAM charges, which are the subject of paragraph 5 
of the lease agreement. After hearing the Defendants' 
testimony, he changed his testimony and stated that he 
recalled the conversations over concern of business failure 
and felt that the sentence referred to a provision to 
renegotiate the lease in the event of the failure of the 
Defendants' business. Mr. Ludlow, not being a party to the 
original negotiations, did not know what was intended by the 
inserted sentence. He admitted that the language of the 
sentence was ambiguous and confusing. 
Based on all of this, the trial court was correct in 
determining that the inserted sentence when read with para-
graph 2 is ambiguous and unclear as to the parties' intent. 
It therefore was correct when it admitted parole evidence to 
clarify the parties' intention. 
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II 
LDDLOW FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL OF THE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE TRIAL COURTS FINDINGS AND THEN 
DEMONSTRATE THAT EVEN VIEWING IT IN THE LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE COURT BELOW, THE EVIDENCE 
IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS. 
In Lyngle v. Lyngle, 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 65 (Utah App. 
1992), the Utah Court of Appeals explained the court's review 
of the trial court's findings on the ambiguity of documents. 
The court stated the following: 
Whether a document is ambiguous is a 
question of law (citation omitted), 
which we review for "correctness" 
(citation omitted), according "no 
particular deference" to the trial 
court's conclusion. (citation omitted) 
Howeverf once the trial court determines 
a document is ambiguous and "proceeds to 
find facts respecting the intentions of 
the parties based on extrinsic evidence, 
then our review is strictly limited." 
(citations omitted) We then "review 
the evidence and all inferences that 
may be drawn therefrom in a light most 
supportive of the findings of the trier 
of fact" and will not disturb the 
trial court's judgment if it is "based 
on substantial, competent, admissible 
evidence." (citations omitted) A 
document is ambiguous "if it is subject 
to two plausable constructions" (citation 
omitted) or its terms are so incomplete 
they create confusion as to its meaning. 
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In the present case, as argued above, the inserted 
sentence led to confusion as to what the term of the lease was 
to be for. Consequently, the trial court admitted extrinsic 
evidence to clarify the parties' intention. Ludlow argues 
that both Mr. Christensen and Mr. McMullin testified that the 
lease term was for three (3) years and that the only reason 
that the Defendants requested to get out of the term was 
because they wanted to lower their rent. While Ludlow takes 
portions of witness's testimony that would appear to support 
his conclusions, he fails to marshal together all evidence in 
support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that 
that evidence is insufficient to support the findings. In this 
case, Ludlow has omitted the fact that Mr. McMullin testified 
that he had no recollection as to the negotiations. He further 
omits the fact that Mr. McMullin, after hearing the testimony 
of the Defendants, recalled that there was conversation in 
regards to concerns over the abilities of the* new business. 
While Mr. McMullin originally stated that he felt that the 
inserted sentence did not apply to the term, but applied to 
the CAM charges only, his later testimony concluded that he 
felt that the term was meant to be subject to the parties 
renegotiation in the event of the Defendants' bankruptcy or 
business failure. Ludlow also fails to show the testimony of 
Mr. Christensen as stating that while they intended to enter 
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into a three (3) year lease, it was their understanding that 
there needed to be a provision that allowed them to leave 
after one year in the event that the business did not succeed. 
Ludlow also omits testimony from Mr. Christensen that the lease 
agreement as first presented was unacceptable and that the 
Defendants needed a way out in the event that their business 
did not succeed. As a result of that concern, Mr. McMullin 
then inserted the typewritten sentence and returned the docu-
ment to the Defendants who, understanding that their concerns 
were met, executed the lease. Ludlow omits the testimony of 
other signers of the lease agreement that supported and 
confirmed Mr. Christensen1s testimony as to the intention of 
the parties. 
Not having marshaled together that evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, Ludlow has failed to 
properly challenge the trial court's findings. The appeal 
must therefore be dismissed. The trial court discounted the 
testimony of Mr. McMullin because of his inability to recall 
the events. The trial court further rejected the interpreta-
tions of Ludlow as being inconsistent with the words of the 
sentence itself. The words of the sentence more closely 
supported the interpretation testified to by the Defendants. 
As a result, the findings of the trial court are not clearly 
erroneous and must be affirmed. 
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III 
THE APPELLEES ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEYS PEES 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. §78-27-56.5 (1953, as amended) 
Ludlow argues that the trial court improperly 
awarded attorney's fees because attorney's fees were not 
properly plead/ because attorney's fees can only be awarded to 
enforce the provisions of the contract and therefore are not 
available if the contract is terminated, and because the 
documents furnished by some of the Appellees do not comply 
with Rule 4-506 [sic] of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
Attorney's fees are available pursuant to paragraph 
32 of the lease agreement. That provision limits such fees to 
$2,500.00. Furthermore, it appears to limit the availability 
of attorney's fees to an action that is brought during the 
term of the lease. While attorney's fees may not be available 
to the Defendants under the lease provision since the action 
was brought after the lease terminated, such fees would have 
been available to- Ludlow had it prevailed on its assertions 
that the lease did not terminate until 1990. Being available 
to Ludlow, such fees are similarly available to the Defendants 
pursuant to Utah's Attorney's Fees Reciprocity Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-56.5 (1953, as amended). 
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In their answer, the Defendants requested that the 
trial court dismiss the Plaintifffs Complaint and that they 
be awarded their attorney's fees incurred in the matter. 
Contrary to Ludlow's assertions, the Rules of Civil Procedure 
do not require that attorney's fees be plead by way of 
counterclaim. 
In L&V Leasing, Inc. v. Collin, 805 P.2d 189 (Utah 
App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals held that where a party 
seeking attorney's fees failed to specify the hourly rate, 
there was not a failure to comply with Rule 4-505 so long as 
the legal basis of the award, the nature of the work performed 
by the attorneys, the number of hours spent to prosecute the 
claim and some affirmation the fees charged are reasonable in 
light of the comparable legal services are included in the 
affidavit submitted by the party requesting the fees. 
In the case at bar, the Affidavit furnished by the 
Appellees Thomas W. Ostler, Neil W. Ostler and John A. 
Vandermyde, set forth the fact that the billable rate for said 
Appellees' attorney was $95.00 an hour and that said rate was 
standard for the firm and in the community. It further stated 
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that through the trial of the above-entitled matter, affiant 
expended 33.5 hours at $95.00 an hour, for a total attorney's 
fee in the amount of $3,182.50. Attached to the Affidavit was 
a breakdown of the total billings for each month. Counsel for 
Ludlow cross-examined Attorney Anderson. During that cross-
examination. Attorney Anderson described the work that was 
required for the hours expended. Ludlow's counsel objected 
to not having a day-by-day breakdown of the hours expended. 
Having set forth the basis for the award, having explained on 
cross-examination the nature of the work performed, having set 
forth the number of hours spent to defend the claim, having 
affirmed the reasonableness of the fees charged, and having 
set forth the hourly rate billed to the Defendants, Rule 
4-505 has been complied with. The Defendants are entitled to 
the attorney's fees awarded. 
IV 
THE DEFENDANTS ARE FURTHER ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS 
FEES ON APPEAL DDE TO THE FRIVOLOUS NATURE OF THE APPEAL. 
Pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, if the Court determines that an appeal taken under 
these Rules is frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined 
in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney's fees, to the 
prevailing party. The Rule further defines a frivolous appeal 
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as one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing 
law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, 
or reverse existing law. 
In the case at bar, it is clear from the document as 
well as the evidence taken at trial by Ludlow's own witnesses, 
that the provisions in question were ambiguous. Therefore, it 
is clear that being ambiguous, the law allows for the court to 
admit extrinsinc evidence in determining the intent of the 
parties. In allowing that extrinsic evidence, it is also 
clear that the weight of the evidence supported the trial 
court's findings and that an appeal would not change that 
conclusion. Ludlow is feeling secure in its position that 
attorney's fees will be capped at $2,500.00 regardless of the 
fees that it requires the other parties to incur as a result 
of its appeal. The appeal is not well-founded in the law nor 
on the facts as they were presented by Ludlow itself. 
Therefore, the court should find the appeal frivolous and 
should award the Defendants their additional attorney's fees 
incurred in defending the action on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision dismissing Ludlow's 
Complaint against the Defendants and awarding attorney's fees 
in favor of the Defendants must be affirmed. In addition, 
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the court should award the Defendants their additional 
attorney's fees incurred in defense of Ludlow's appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 17th day of July, 1992. 
JoKm Burton Anderson 
Attorney for Defendants Thomas W. 
Ostler, Neil W. Ostler and 
John A. Vandermyde 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROY S. LUDLOW INVESTMENT CO., : MINUTE ENTRY 
Plaintiff, : Case No. 890903593 CV 
vs. : JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
THOMAS W. OSTLER, et al., : 
Defendants. : 
Now before the Court is plaintiff's Motion in Limine. 
The Court has reviewed the memos filed in support of and in 
opposition thereto, has reviewed the Lease itself and now rules 
as follows: 
Plaintiff seeks to exclude parole evidence in the nature 
of an interpretation of the Lease Agreement. Page 1 of the 
Lease establishes the length of term for the Lease to be three 
(3) consecutive full years. In Page 6 of the Lease under the 
paragraph entitled "Continuous Operation" the parties have typed 
in the sentence "At the end of each year the tenant and landlord 
will jointly review the contract for renewal." That sentence 
does not appear to apply exclusively to paragraph 9 (Continous 
g \ #¥ #* *•* ^ ^ *-* 
Operation) of the Lease. If it does appear exclusively to 
Paragraph 9 it is not clear on it's face how it does so. The 
subject sentence would appear to apply more appropriately to the 
entire Lease Agreement. However if that is the case there is an 
inconsistency between that statement and Paragraph 2 of the 
Lease which sets the length of term at three (3) years. 
Under all of these circumstances the Court is of the 
opinion that the subject sentence is indeed ambiguous as used in 
the context of this Lease and rules that it would be helpful to 
the trier of fact to receive parole evidence to explain this 
particular provision of the Lease, and accordingly will deny 
plaintiff's Motion in Limine. 
Counsel for defendants is to prepare an order consistent 
with this ruling. i^  
DATED this (0 day of November, 1991. 
FRANK G. NOEL ^ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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